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Corporations - Common Law Liabilities for Insider Trading
Defendants, directors of a corporation whose stock was traded over the
counter, allegedly acted on inside information of a decline in corporate
earnings when they sold on the market stock from their personal holdings.
Other stockholders, admittedly not purchasers from defendants, brought a
derivative action for an accounting of the insiders" profits. The trial court
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and the appellate division
reversed' Held, affirmed: Officers and directors may be liable at common
law to their corporation, whether or not it suffers harm, for profits taken
in stock transactions which result from use of inside information. Diamond
v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
I. DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS
DEALING IN COMPANY SHARES
A director's relation to his corporation or its shareholders is that of
agent and, in some cases, trustee.3 His position is generally one of fiduciary
obligation, but more specific implications of a director's trustee or agent
status vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. When, on his own
behalf, a director deals with a third party, whether or not a shareholder,
in the stock of a corporation he directs, there are several views of his
duties and potential liabilities.4
No Fiduciary Duties. In some jurisdictions, a director has no fiduciary
duty, either to the corporation or its shareholders, in the sale or purchase
of stock with third parties.' This rule has been called one of "uncon-
scionable laxity,"' but it has had wide acceptance.7 It was the early New
York rule, announced in Carpenter v. Dan forth! There the court held
I Pleadings showed the amount in question to be about $800,000. Profits were computed as the
difference between what defendants sold for and the market value of the stock after disclosure.
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (1969).
'Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968).
' Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 234 (N.Y. Ch. 1832), citing the dictum by Chancellor
Kent in Attorney-General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371, 389 (N.Y. Ch. 1817); see 3 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA O THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 838 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as FLETCHER].
' See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 500 (1966); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933).
'E.g., Clayton v. James B. Clow & Sons, 212 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ill. 1962), aft'd, 327 F.2d
382 (7th Cir. 1964); Faraclas v. City Vending Co., 232 Md. 457, 194 A.2d 298 (1963); Nelson
v. Northland Life Ins. Co., 197 Minn. 151, 266 N.W. 857 (1936); Gardner v. Baldi, 24 N.J. Super.
228, 93 A.2d 644 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952); Howell v. McCloskey, 375 Pa. 100, 99 A.2d 610
(1953). And see cases collected at 3 FLETCHER § 1168.1. The general statement of the rule applies
only if the corporation itself is not engaged in market activities. E.g., Vulcanized Rubber & Plastic
Co. v. Scheckter, 400 Pa. 405, 162 A.2d 400 (1960); see text accompanying notes 31-32 infra.
The rule only applies in the absence of a finding of other facts to support a fiduciary relationship.
Cf. Konsuvo v. Netzke, 91 N.J. Super. 353, 220 A.2d 424 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966); Illinois
Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 41 I11. 2d 215, 242 N.E.2d 228 (1968).
'H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 80, at 213 (1946) [hereinafter cited as BALLANTINE].
'It was once the established majority rule. See Annot., 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933). But in jurisdic-
tions nominally supporting the rule, there is a tendency to make the existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship a fact question determinable by circumstance related to the defendant's directorship.
Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 41 I11. 2d 215, 242 N.E.2d 228 (1968); Konsuvo v. Netzke, 91
N.J. Super. 353, 220 A.2d 424 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966). And see H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING
AND THE STOCK MARKET 22 n.8 (1966) [hereinafter cited as MANNE].
8 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868).
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that before a director might be held liable to the stockholders with whom
he dealt, he must be shown to have been guilty of "actual, positive"' fraud,
relied upon by the other party. The case involved a face-to-face transac-
tion, but it presumedly announced a rule for market transactions also.
The court noted that in transactions on public stock exchanges, there
could be no reliance and thus no liability, inasmuch as parties trade with
an eye to market price of stocks as distingued from real value based on the
knowledge of insiders.
The rule that directors have no fiduciary duties in the trading of shares,
either to the corporation or to individual shareholders, is supported by
several arguments. One rationale is that since corporations ordinarily have
no interest in their own shares and since the trusteeship of the director
extends only so far as the corporation's business interests, the director's
dealings in his corporation's shares are without the scope of the fiduciary
relation." Another rationale is that stockholders are able to protect them-
selves by inspecting corporate books and records before trading." Critics
of this view have noted that for large, publicly-traded corporations, such
an inspection is hardly practical." On the other hand, for such corpora-
tions, insider trading has been suggested as an efficient means of entre-
prenurial reward for employees."
Fiduciary Duty to Individual Shareholder. The fiduciary obligation of
the director has sometimes extended to the individual shareholder for
whose benefit the corporation's activities are conducted. Two standards of
disclosure have come to reflect a rule that directors who trade with other
stockholders owe a fiduciary duty to them as individuals. The "special
facts" doctrine requires disclosure by the selling or purchasing director
of any "special facts" affecting stock values.'" The "minority" doctrine
imposes upon the director a duty to disclose all material information." The
IId. at 587.
'
0 FLETCHER § 900 nn.5, 6; Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase
Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 54 (1960).
'
5 Bollstrom v. Duplex Power Car Co., 208 Mich. 15, 175 N.W. 492 (1919); FLETCHEP. 5
1168.1, at 857.
" Dunnett v. Arn, 71 F.2d 912, 918 (10th Cir. 1934).
'
3 MANNE 131-45.
'"The leading case is Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). A discussion of what may be
"special circumstances" is given at Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202 N.W. 955, 956 (1925).
Michigan apparently conditions application of the rule upon the making of inquiry by the outsider.
Cf. Schuur v. Berry, 285 Mich. 654, 281 N.W. 393 (1938). The "special facts" rule would appar-
ently obtain in Texas. Westwood v. Continental Can Co., 80 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1935). Cases
establishing the rule for New York are collected at note 23 infra.
" The rule is "minority" doctrine with respect to the "so-called" majority rule that no fiduciary
duty exists. BALLANTINE § 80, at 213; cf., on the "majority" rule, text accompanying notes 5-7
supra. A leading minority rule case is Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903). For recent
statements of the rule, see King Mfg. Co. v. Clay, 216 Ga. 581, 118 S.E.2d 581 (1961); Jacobson
v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967); Holtz v. Landauer, 270 Wis. 203, 70 N.W.2d
633 (1955). Massachusetts would apply the minority rule to a director dealing face-to-face with
another shareholder, but not to a director who deals in the market. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass.
358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). California adopts at least the "special facts" doctrine. Jones v. H.E.
Ahmanson & Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 293 (Ct. App. 1969). An equally recent decision imposes the
"minority rule." Brown v. Halbert, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781, 788-89 (Ct. App. 1969). Brown is unusual
in that, like Diamond v. Oreamuno, it imposes the duty of disclosure upon insiders who sell. In
Brown, the stock sold was a controlling block.
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two standards are said to reach the same result in the cases," but the
"special facts" doctrine is considered the less burdensome for the direc-
tor." Under either doctrine, an injured stockholder may rescind his trans-
action or recover profits related to the breach of duty. The rule is one of
fairness to the stockholder who is in a weak bargaining position, especially
the stockholder of a publicly-traded company.'9 Recovery by the indivi-
dual stockholder prevents the accrual to directors of gains that belong to
all stockholders." In close corporations, where the relationship of stock-
holders is often very similar to that of partners, the rule imposing fidu-
ciary duties on stockholders inter sese has the same salutary effects it has in
partnership law."
New York adopted the "special facts" doctrine first by a holding in a
close corporation case," and subsequently in the cautious dictum of Fischer
v. Guaranty Trust Co.' In Fischer, the plaintiff sought recovery on behalf
of the estate of a decedent who had purchased stock for a trivial sum and
later resold it for a large sum which might have been larger had she been
fully apprised of information affecting the stock value. About ten years
after the stockholder died, a suit was brought on behalf of her estate by
attorneys who were, but for the suit, strangers to the estate. The court
noted that under the facts of the case it was faced with a "clearly . . .
champertous venture"' and held against the individual stockholders, but
conceded the possibility of a recovery in other circumstances.'
Fiduciary Duty to Corporation. Federal statutes permit certain corpora-
"6Seitz v. Fry, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N.W. 266 (1922); FLETCHER § 1168.2, at 861; Conant,
Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 59-63
(1960).
17 BALLANTINE § 80, at 213.
"8Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Taylor v. Wright, 67 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d
980 (1945); Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Hotchkiss v. Fletcher, 136 Kan.
350, 16 P.2d 531 (1932).
'
9 Dunnett v. Arn, 71 F.2d 912, 918 (10th Cir. 1934).
"°Dawson v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929, 933 (1916).
"Cf. Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 41 Ill. 2d 215, 242 N.E.2d 228 (1968). See also F.
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.15 (1958).
"Saville v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N.Y.S. 768 (1932), aff'd, 262 N.W. 567, 188 N.E.
67 (1933). During negotiations for the purchase of a controlling block of stock, the defendant
officers had understated corporate earnings. The court said:
It is not necessary to establish a technical case of fraud and deceit. The relation be-
tween plaintiff and defendants was like that of a fiduciary. Defendants were directors
and officers of a very small corporation, whose stock was not listed or traded any-
where, whose business was small and known only to themselves, and who, in purchas-
ing control from the plaintiff, were under a duty to disclose to her the full facts
of the condition of the company ....
Saville v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N.Y.S. 768, 770 (1932).
""Under certain specific circumstances, the director occupies such a relation to the . . . stock-
holder that he is bound to act somewhat as a trustee in making a purchase for his cestui." Fischer
v. Guaranty Trust Co., 259 App. Div. 176, 18 N.Y.S.2d 328, 334 (1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 629,
34 N.E.2d 379 (1941). The case appeared to preserve a requirement of reliance by any plaintiff
shareholder. But an entitlement to rely, in the face of a director's silence, merely underscores the
existence of a fiduciary relation. Fischer is interpreted as having adopted the special facts doctrine
for New York. Lesnick v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 977 (2d Cir. 1944); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 245-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
24 Fischer v. Guaranty Trust Co., 259 App. Div. 176, 18 N.Y.S.2d 328, 332 (1940).
2 18 N.Y.S.2d at 334. In Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
minority shareholders had a cause of action under state law for sale of their stock at a low price
caused by insiders' restricting dividends. The court relied on Fischer.
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tions to recover profits from short-swing trading by specified insiders."
Such recovery is founded on a policy favoring fair trading for the public. 7
Civil relief for violation of rule lob-5 is available to traders in the stock
of any corporation, regardless of size or number of stockholders,"s but
seems permissible in favor of a corporation only if the corporation has
been a seller or a purchaser." Thus, in companies not of a certain size"
federal law does not create any liability running from the director to the
corporation for trading with third parties.
Two common law theories support the imposition upon a director of a
fiduciary duty to his corporation in his stock transactions with third par-
ties. The first, recognized judicially, 1 applies the director's duty of loyalty
to the corporation in the situation in which the corporation is engaged in
stock transactions with the public. The director violates his duty of loyalty
because his trading may be in competition with the corporation's market
activity. In Brophy v. Cities Service Co. 2 a corporate officer's secretary had
knowledge of a company's plans to purchase its own shares in the market
and the secretary made purchases for himself before the company acquisi-
tions began. His subsequent gains from appreciation in the stock's price
were recoverable by the corporation regardless of whether it suffered loss,
under the principle that an agent is not to derive any secret profit from
information taken in confidence and in the course of his agency. The
Delaware court noted that in the absence of special circumstances, cor-
porate fiduciaries were free to trade in corporate stock, but the court held
that the company's plans to purchase stock in the market were such special
circumstances. Since the action was for unjust enrichment, no loss to the
corporation needed to be shown.
The absence of a requirement for damages underscores the preventive
policy equity adopts in dealing with conflicts of interest in fiduciary rela-
tions. Equity interests itself only in the possibility of conflict of personal
interest and fiduciary duty. 3 Protection of the fiduciary relation, once it
is recognized to exist, has often aroused the conscience of the chancellor,"
and not surprisingly, an award for punitive damages has been allowed for
breaches of fiduciary duty involving stock transactions."
2 The profits must derive from trading within a six-month period and the trading must be by
an officer, director, or the beneficial owner of more than 10% of any class of stock. Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) (1963). The corporation must have assets exceed-
ing $1,000,000 and it must have 500 or more shareholders. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1963).27 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1931), aff'd with modification
as to interest awarded, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
2" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1963); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b5
(1944).
2A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAu -SEC RULE 10b-5, § 4.7(3), at 88.2 n.85 (1967).
3oSupra note 26.
" International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
"Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949).
aIn re Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 923, 103 N.E.2d 721, 725 (19S2).4 Cf. the language of Lord Hardwicke quoted in Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 232 (N.Y.
Ch. 1832): " 'I will never determine that a court of equity cannot lay hold of every such breach
of trust. I will never determine that frauds of this kind are out of the reach of courts of law or
equity; for an intolerable grievance would follow from such a determination.' " See also the language
collected at In re Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 923, 103 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1952).
as International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 584 (Tex. 1963). The
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The second common law theory supporting liability to the corporation
for profits taken in trading on inside information is that the corporation
has a property interest in the information. Judicially, this principle has
been recognized when there has been a diversion of corporate opportun-
ity," or at least a diversion of information useful to the corporation in the
conduct of its profit-making activities." Commentators have advanced the
theory in favor of a corporate recovery, as opposed to recovery by outside
traders, in insider trading cases. Their argument has been that recovery
by outside traders in an established market gives them a windfall for the
fortuity of having traded with insiders." A practical argument rests on
the difficulty, stemming from stock exchange mechanics, of linking insid-
ers to any particular transaction."
Duty to Both Stockholders and Corporations. A New York court sug-
gested in Von Au v. Augenheimer" that when directors willfully drove
down the price of stock by circulating false rumors of a company's weak-
ened condition, a recovery might be had by both the corporation (for any
damage to its credit) and stockholders (for the depressed value of their
stock). Liability to both corporation and stockholder would also seem
to be possible under existing law in the situation in which, without posi-
tive fraud, an insider with information of his corporation's plans for pur-
chase or sale of its own stock, traded or sold to third parties."
II. DIAMOND V. OREAMUNO
The New York court of appeals forged an unprecedented holding in
Diamond v. Oreamuno by bringing together established principles of
common law, the sentiment of decisions applying federal securities law,
and a remedy created by federal legislation for conduct related to, but
not the same as, the conduct in Diamond.
Citing a number of cases based on the fiduciary duties of agents or
trustees,"4 the court stated the "general proposition, that [one who] ac-
quires special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential or fi-
duciary relationship . . .is not free to exploit that knowledge for his own
Holloway opinion does not rest on the "inside" nature of the information used by directors, but
rather on the directors' breaches of fiduciary duty not to compete with the corporation.
"
6 E.g., Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 2 A.2d 225 (Ch. 1938), aff'd, 23 Del. Ch. 255,
5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
" E.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Tlapek, 265 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Ark. 1967), modified, 407 F.2d
1129 (8th Cir. 1969).
"8 Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q.
53, 64 (1960); Note, A Suggested Locus of Recovery in National Exchange Violations of Rule
lob-5, 54 CORNELL L.Q. 306, 308 (1969).
39 Note, supra note 38, at 308.
40 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FsAu--SEC RULE lob-$, § 7.1 n.3 (1967).
41 126 App. Div. 257, 110 N.Y.S. 629 (1908).
'This result might be possible in Texas. Cf. International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway,
368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963); Westwood v. Continental Can Co., 80 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1935).
The latter case seems to adopt the special facts doctrine for Texas.
'324 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
"The cases cited in Diamond, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80-81, are: In re Bond
& Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721 (1952); Byrne v. Barrett, 268 N.Y.
199, 197 N.E. 217 (1935); Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 154 N.E. 303 (1926); Dutton v.
Willner, 52 N.Y. 312 (1873).
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benefit but must account to his principal for any profits derived there-
from."" The court reasoned that since corporate directors are fiduciaries,
and knowledge of a decline in company earnings can be acquired by vir-
tue of their fiduciary relation, then the directors must account to the cor-
poration for any profits derived from that knowledge.
The court said that the concepts underlying a recovery on behalf of
the corporation were "hardly ... new"' citing, inter alia, Brophy v. Cities
Service Co. 7 and section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. How-
ever, these authorities scarcely detract from the newness of the Diamond
holding. Brophy, on its face, applies only to the special circumstances
raised by a corporation's plans to purchase its own shares. s Section 16b of
the Securities Exchange Act applies to only one type of market manipula-
tion (short-swing trading), only to corporations of a certain size and dis-
persed ownership, and only to certain insiders of those corporations. " The
court itself recognized that the primary policy supporting section 16b
was protection of the investing public.
The court supported its proposition that the corporation might re-
cover whether or not it suffered losss° by citing the Restatement (Second)
of Agency section 388 s" and cases from the law of trusts, agency, and cor-
porations. " The Restatement, comment (e)," does lend weight to the
holding in Diamond, but heretofore no cases had lent weight to the Re-
statement in the area of directors' liabilities in stock transactions with
third parties." Indeed, the widely spoken dictum that no loss is required
on the part of the corporation is supported more by the logic of the pre-
ventive policy involved than by the facts of particular cases." In any
4524 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (1969).
'248 N.E.2d at 913, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
4731 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d s (Ch. 1949).
4 A later Delaware court has read Brophy as resting on this special circumstance. Equity Corp.
v. Milton, 213 A.2d 439, 442 (Del. Ch. 1965).
49 Supra note 26.
" The opinion suggests that this corporation may have suffered loss. "When officers and directors
abuse their position . . . to gain personal profits, the effect may be to cast a cloud on the corpora-
tion's name, injure stockholder relations and undermine public regard for the corporation's securi-
ties." 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 82. To the extent that public opinion is shaped by
court decisions, the court's reasoning is circuitous.
S RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958): "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent
who makes a profit in connection with transactions conducted by him on behalf of the principal
is under a duty to give such profit to the principal."
52 Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949); In re Bond & Mortgage
Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721 (1952).
'a [I]f he [a corporate officer] has 'inside information' that the corporation is about to
purchase or sell securities, or to declare or to pass a dividend, profits made by him in
stock transactions undertaken because of his knowledge are held in constructive trust
for the principal. He is also liable for profits made by selling confidential information
to third persons, even though the principal is not adversely affected.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 388, comment (c) (1958).
54RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY Appendix § 388 (1958); RESTATEMENT IN THE
COURTS, SUPPLEMENT (1965, 1967, 1968). The RESTATEMENT has been considered in an analogous
situation, but not applied. Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799, 809 (3d Cir. 1949).
The defendant had succeeded in converting a mutual insurance company into a stock company. A
suit on behalf of the erstwhile mutual company was unsuccessful because defendant as agent for
the mutual company had acted so openly that ratification by the company could be inferred. The
agency relationship arose specifically for stock transactions.
5a3 FLETCHER § 884, at 290, cites a number of precedents for the proposition that harm to
[Vol. 23
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event, cases in which the no-loss language is invoked must reach the ques-
tion of liability without loss only after a determination that the requisite
fiduciary relation exists with respect to any given transaction. In applying
the rule that no loss is required, the court cited a trusts case of its own,
but did not mention the distinction made in that case between the fiduciary
duties of the trustee and the corporate director."
The court recognized that its result includes the possibility of double
liability for the director, but it reasoned that the likelihood of a suit by
purchasers is "quite remote." 7 In the argument of this case defendants
admitted liability to purchasers, and such liability would appear to be like-
ly in a federal action. 8 Liability to purchasers could also apparently be
established under New York law," but the Diamond opinion does not
consider the relation of its holding to the possibility of recovery under the
"special facts" doctrine. Perhaps the court paid indirect attention to the
implications of its earlier precedents, when it conceded the possibility of
superior claims by third parties and hinted that while the defendants might
be subject to more than one suit, liability would not be "double" if the
corporation's recovery were diminished by amounts refunded to injured
purchasers."
The court reasoned that the existence of an extensive federal statutory
scheme did not weigh against the fashioning of new state remedies."' The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 specifically preserves any remedies which
might exist at law or in equity,"2 and civil relief under rule Iob-5 is yet so
undeveloped as not to deter the development of possibly concurrent state
remedies. 3
the corporation is immaterial, but most of the cases state the rule without applying it. Higgins v.
Shenango Pottery Co., 256 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1958) (diversion of corporate opportunity to part-
nership composed of officers and directors); Fleishhacker v. Blum, 109 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1940)
(bank president took bonus for making a loan) ; Pratt v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 100 F.2d 833 (10th
Cir. 1938) (geologist took interest in mineral leases for self); Western States Life Ins. Co. v.
Lockwood, 166 Cal. 185, 135 P. 496 (1913) (director coerced secret profit from seller of plaintiff
corporation's stock); Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 2 A.2d 225 (Ch. 1938), afl'd, 23 Del.
Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (diversion of corporate opportunity); Hoyt v. Hampe, 206
Iowa 206, 214 N.W. 718 (1927) (defendant directors diverted corporate funds to third-party
purchaser of their stock in plaintiff corporation); Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime
Co., 334 Mo. 319, 66 S.W.2d 889 (1933) (defendant used corporate funds without paying interest
to purchase stock in corporation); Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 53 A.2d 143 (1947)
(defendant insider diverted to other corporations advantages arising from defaulted lease); Bailey
v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 189 A. 320 (1937) (diversion of corporate funds to divert a corporate
opportunity); Bird Coal & Iron Co. v. Humes, 157 Pa. 278, 27 A. 750 (1893) (director took
profit from corporation's lessee).
'"In re Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 923, 103 N.E.2d 721, 726 (1952). Attorneys
for trustee on mortgage bonds were disqualified from taking a fee because they dealt in the certifi-
cates under the mortgage. The attorneys had the same duty not to do business with the trust as the
trustees themselves. Citing Fischer v. Guaranty Trust Co., 259 App. Div. 176, 18 N.Y.S.2d 328
(1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 629, 34 N.E.2d 379 (1941), the court said, "Such a situation is not com-
parable to the one now before us."
s 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 86 (1969).
as 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
"' See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
'0248 N.E.2d at 916, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
6' 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
62 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1963).
63 Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 85 (1969).
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III. CONCLUSION
Diamond v. Oreamuno creates a new liability for corporate directors. It
brings the common law and equity treatment of all corporate insiders to
the point reached for some insiders under federal law. That point is one
at which it is perilous for a director to trade at all in the stock of a cor-
poration he directs. 4
There are good reasons for closely limiting the Diamond holding to its
facts. If the decision does not create a likelihood of double liability, it at
least prepares the track for a race to the courthouse. The court did not
consider the hardships it may visit on a corporation which recovers as in
Diamond, only to face a later suit by those with a superior claim." The
Diamond rule is clearly inapposite when, in a close corporation, an insider's
purchases in breach of his duty establish for him such an ownership posi-
tion that recovery by the corporation would largely inure to his benefit. 6
The rule in any case would not be comforting to the stockholder who sold
to an insider trading in violation of an alleged duty. For close corpora-
tions, an extension of the Diamond principle beyond the field of securities
transactions67 would seem unfortunate in light of a frequent identity of
interests of stockholders and the corporation, and in light of the absence
of a strong public interest such as supports the parallel corporate recovery
under federal law. Finally, it may be said that at some juncture, it will be
undesirable to inject into the marketplace a rule against the morals
thereof."
W. Wilson Jones
64This possibility is recognized in N.Y.S.E., THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR AND THE INVESTING
PUBLIC 12 (1962).
65 See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
66 Cf. Providence Trust Co. v. Geyer, 248 Pa. 423, 94 A. 77 (1915), in which defendant in-
siders bought corporate stock at par and sold it to X group at par plus $14. The court ruled that
the defendants' held their profits in trust for stockholders at the time of their purchase from the
corporation, since a recovery by the corporation would only benefit X group.
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388, comment (c) (1958), suggests the possible and
unfortunate breadth of the Diamond holding: "[W]here a corporation has decided to operate an
enterprise at a place where land values will be increased because of such operation, a corporate
officer who takes advantage of his special knowledge to buy land in the vicinity is accountable for
the profit he makes, even though such purchases have no adverse effect upon the enterprise." Such
an application of Diamond would seem to take the director's liability beyond that of the strict
trustee. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 203, comment (e) (1959).
6 Cf. the language of Cardozo, J., in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(1928): "Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the
duty of the finest loyalty . . . . A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place" (emphasis added). This is part of the language quoted in In re Bond & Mortgage
Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1952), cited in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d
494, 248 N.E.d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (1969). Compare the reasoning of the Massachusetts
court in Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 355, 361-63, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933):
An honest director would be in a difficult situation if he could neither buy nor sell
on the stock exchange . . .. stock in his corporation without first seeking out the other
• . . ultimate party . . . and disclosing to him everything which a court or jury
might later find that he then knew affecting the real or speculative value of such
shares. Business of that nature is a matter to be governed by practical rules. Fiduciary
obligations of directors ought not to be made so onerous that men of experience and
ability will be deterred from accepting such office. Law in its sanctions is not co-
extensive with morality.
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